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Abstract. This study presents a novel soft computing system that provides net-
work managers with a synthetic and intuitive representation of the situation of the 
monitored network, in order to reduce the widely known high false-positive rate 
associated to misuse-based Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs). The proposed sys-
tem is based on the use of different projection methods for the visual inspection of 
honeypot data, and may be seen as a complementary network security tool that 
sheds light on internal data structures through visual inspection. Furthermore, it is 
intended to understand the performance of Snort (a well-known misuse-based 
IDS) through the visualization of attack patterns. Empirical verification and com-
parison of the proposed projection methods are performed in a real domain where 
real-life data are defined and analyzed. 
Keywords. Projection Models, Artificial Neural Networks, Unsupervised Learn-
ing, Soft Computing, Network & Computer Security, Intrusion Detection, Honey-
pots. 
1   Introduction 
A network attack or intrusion will inevitably violate one of the three computer se-
curity principles -availability, integrity and confidentiality- by exploiting certain 
vulnerabilities such as Denial of Service, Modification and Destruction [1]. Now-
adays, there is a wide range of tools that support the rapid detection and identifica-
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tion of attack attempts and intrusions. The ones applied in this study are briefly in-
troduced in this section. 
A honeypot has no authorised function or productive value within the corporate 
network other than to be explored, attacked or compromised [2]. Thus, a honeypot 
should not receive any traffic at all. Any connection attempt with a honeypot is 
then an attack or attempt to compromise the device or services that it is offering- 
is by default illegitimate traffic. From the security point of view, there is a great 
deal that may be learnt from a honeypot about a hacker’s tools and methods in or-
der to improve the protection of information systems. In a honeynet, all the traffic 
received by the sensors is suspicious by default. Thus every packet should be con-
sidered as an attack or at least as a piece of a multi-step attack. 
Snort is a libpcap-based [3] lightweight network intrusion detection system, is 
one of the most widely deployed IDS. It is a network-based, misuse-based IDS. 
Snort detects many types of malicious activity in the packet payload that can be 
characterized in a unique detection signature. It is focused on collecting packets as 
quickly as possible and processing them in the Snort detection engine. 
Misuse-based IDSs entail one main problem; intrusions whose signatures are 
not archived by the system can not be detected. As a consequence, a misuse-based 
IDS will never detect a new (previously unseen) attack [4], also known as 0-day 
attack. The completeness of such IDSs requires regular updating of their knowl-
edge of attacks. Even if the capabilities of Snort allow a deep analysis of the traf-
fic flows, what interests in this research is the detection, alerting and logging of 
the network packets as they arrive to a Honeynet system. 
Visualization is a critical issue in the computer network defence environment, 
which chiefly serves to generate a synthetic and intuitive representation of the cur-
rent situation for the network manager; as a result, several research initiatives have 
recently applied information visualization to this challenging task [5] [6] [7] [8]. 
Visualization techniques typically aim to make the available statistics supplied by 
traffic-monitoring systems more understandable in an interactive way. They there-
fore focus on traffic data as well as on network topology. Regardless of their spe-
cific characteristics, these methods all map high-dimensional feature data into a 
low-dimensional space for presentation purposes. The baseline of the research 
presented in this study is that soft computing, in general, and unsupervised con-
nectionist models [9, 10], in particular, can prove quite adequate for the purpose of 
network data visualization through dimensionality reduction. As a result, unsuper-
vised projection models are applied in the present research for the visualization of 
Honeypot and Snort data. The main associated goal is to analysis and assess the 
Snort output thanks to visual media. 
The remaining sections of this study are structured as follows: section 2 pre-
sents the proposed soft computing approach and the neural projection techniques 
applied in this work. Some experimental results are presented and described in 
section 3; the conclusions of this study are discussed in section 4, as well as future 
work. 
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2   A Visualization based on Soft-Computing 
This study proposes the application of projection models for the visualization of 
honeypot and Snort data. Visualisation techniques have been applied to massive 
datasets, such as those generated by honeynets, for many years. These techniques 
are considered a viable approach to information seeking, as humans are able to 
recognize different features and to detect anomalies by inspecting graphs [11]. The 
underlying operational assumption of the proposed approach is mainly grounded 
in the ability to render the high-dimensional traffic data in a consistent yet low-
dimensional representation. So, security visualisation tools have to map high-
dimensional feature data into a low-dimensional space for presentation. One of the 
main assumptions of the research presented in this paper is that neural projection 
models  [9, 10], as soft computing techniques, will prove themselves to be satis-
factory for the purpose of security data visualisation through dimensionality re-
duction. 
Projection methods can be smart compression tools that map raw, high-
dimensional data onto two or three dimensional spaces for subsequent graphical 
display. By doing so, the structure that is identified through a multivariable dataset 
may be visually analysed with greater ease. 
Visualisation tools can therefore support security tasks in the following way: 
• Visualisation tools may be understood intuitively (even by inexperienced staff) 
and require less configuration time than more conventional tools. 
• Providing an intuitive visualization of data allows inexperienced security staff 
to learn more about standard network behaviour, which is a key issue in ID 
[12]. The monitoring task can be then assigned to less experienced security 
staff. 
Due to the aforementioned reasons, the present study approaches the analysis of 
honeynet data from a visualization standpoint. That is, some neural projection 
techniques are applied for the visualization of such data. The different projection 
models applied in this study are described in the following sections. 
Differentiating from previous studies, Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) 
[13, 14] models are applied in the present study as a complementary tool for ID 
analysing real complex high-dimensional honeynet data sets. In this sense, now 
the output of both the neural model and Snort (the novel applied IDS) are com-
bined for comprehensive analysis and understanding of network status. In keeping 
with this idea, the Snort output is intuitively visualized comprising some other in-
formation inherent in the unsupervised neural visualization. Based on to this visu-
alization, Snort performance may be easily interpreted and analysed, leading to a 
proper update of its attack patter/rules. 
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2.1 Principal Component Analysis 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) is a standard statistical technique for com-
pressing data; it can be shown to give the best linear compression of the data in 
terms of least mean square error. There are several Artificial Neural Networks 
(ANNs) or connectionist models which have been shown to perform PCA e.g. [15, 
16, 17].  
This technique describes the variation in a set of multivariate data in terms of a 
set of uncorrelated variables, in decreasing order of importance, each of which is a 
linear combination of the original variables. It should be noted that even if we are 
able to characterize the data with a few variables, it does not follow that an inter-
pretation will ensue. 
2.2 Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning 
The Cooperative Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) model [18] 
extends the Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (MLHL) [14] model, which 
is based on Exploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) [13]. Considering an N- dimen-
sional input vector ( x ), and an M-dimensional output vector ( ), with being 
the weight (linking input
y ijW
j  to output ), then CMLHL can be expressed as: i
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Where: η  is the learning rate, τ  is the “strength” of the lateral connections,  
the bias parameter,  a parameter related to the energy function [14, 18] and 
b
p A  
a symmetric matrix used to modify the response to the data [18]. The effect of this 
matrix is based on the relation between the distances separating the output neu-
rons. 
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3    Analyzing Real-life Data from a Honeynet 
The Euskalert project [13] has deployed a network of honeypots in the Basque 
Country (northern Spain) where eight companies and institutions have installed 
one of the project’s sensors behind the firewalls of their corporate networks. The 
honeypot sensor transmits all the traffic received to a database via a secure com-
munication channel.  
This honeypot system receives 4000 packets a month on average. All the traffic 
is analyzed by the Snort IDS, and an alert is launched whenever the packet match-
es a known attack signature. Each incoming packet is inspected and compared 
with the default rule base. This way, many of them match the Snort rule base sig-
natures. Thereby, even if a big amount of packets cause more than one alarm to be 
triggered, it facilitates a simple way to separate the alarm set into two subsets: 
• Alarms that have been triggered when matching the Snort default rule base. 
This dataset can be considered as known attack data. 
• Alarms that did not match any of the known attack rules. Considered as the 
unknown data and related to attacks as all the traffic targeting Euskalert. 
These two subsets allow further research to distinguish between the known and 
unknown attack traffic. This permits testing the success rate of Snort, and also 
visualizing the unknown traffic looking for new and unknown attacks. In some 
sense, Snort is used as a network data classifier, without discarding any packet. In 
addition to the default rules of the Snort community, three basic rules that log all 
TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic have been applied. 
The experimental research has been done by using data related to one month of 
real attacks that reached the 8 sensors used by the Euskalert project [13]. These 
data are depicted through different neural projections in order to discover real at-
tack behaviour and strategies. For this experiment, we have analysed the logs 
coming from Euskalert and Snort gathered during February 2010. 
The February 2010 dataset contains a total of 3798 packets, including TCP, 
UDP and ICMP traffic received by the distributed honeypot sensors. 
From this dataset, it may be said that Snort is only capable of identifying about 
10.38% of bad-intentioned traffic. Furthermore, it was demonstrated that only 2% 
of the unsolicited traffic was identified by the IDS when automatically generated 
signatures were included from a previous work [19]. Thus, a deeper analysis of the 
data is needed in order to discover the internal structure of the remaining close to 
90% of the traffic. Explaining the behaviour of the unknown traffic is a difficult 
task that must be performed to better protect and understand computer networks 
and systems. 
3.2 Experimental Results 
The following features were extracted from each one of the records in the dataset: 
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• Time: the time when the attack was detected. Difference in relation to the first 
attack in the dataset (in minutes). 
• Protocol: whether TCP, UDP or ICMP (codified as three binary features). 
• Ip_len: number of bytes in the packet. 
• Source Port: number of the port from which the source host sent the packet. In 
ICMP protocol, this represents the ICMP type field. 
• Destination Port: destination host port number to which the packet is sent. In 
the ICMP protocol, this represents the ICMP type field. 
• Flags: control bits of a TCP packet, which contains 8 1-bit values. 
• Snort output: binary feature stating whether the record triggered a Snort alarm 
or not. 
The previously introduced projection techniques were applied to this real data-
set, generating the projections shown in this section. In these projections, the data 
are depicted with different colors and shapes, taking into account the Snort output:  
• Black crosses: meaning that the packets triggered any of Snort rules. 
• Red circles: meaning that the packets did not trigger any of Snort rules. 
Fig. 1 shows the CMLHL projection by considering the Snort output. This was 
selected as the best visualization offered by the different applied projection mod-




Fig. 1. CMLHL projection – Snort output. 
From this visualization, it can be concluded that most of the traffic corresponds 
to unknown packets, were Snort did not provide any explanation or alert for the 
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suspicious packets received. Snort can only detect attacks on well-known services. 
A deeper analysis on what is detected and what is not, arise the fact that most of 
ICMP traffic (probes and error codes) and a big amount of traffic targeting privi-
leged destination ports is detected. 
3.3 Comparative Study 
For comparative purposes, some other visualizations of the Euskalert-Snort da-
ta were generated. Firstly, scatter plot visualizations of the original features of the 
data were obtained, the best of them selected and included in this study (Figs. 3 
and 4). In these visualizations, the data are depicted with different colors, taking 
into account the Snort output:  
• Blue: meaning that the packets did not trigger any of Snort rules. 
• Red: meaning that the packets triggered any of Snort rules. 
 
a) Destination port 
 
b) Destination port & Protocol 
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c) Destination port & IP length 
 
d) Destination port & Source port 
Fig. 2. Visualizations based on the original features of the data and the Snort output. 
It can be said, after analysing these visualizations that scatter plots provide with 
basic information of the discovered attacks. The first visualization (Fig. 2.a) shows 
that most of the detected packets target low port numbers (non-privileged). The 
main reason for such happening is that Snort signatures are created for known at-
tacks exploiting widely used vulnerable applications. Figure 2.b. is not very clear 
one, but shows that UDP and ICMP traffic have more undetected traffic than TCP. 
How the destination port is distributed among the different protocols is also an in-
teresting outcome of this visualization (for ICMP, its type is coded into destination 
port). An analysis of the graphical representation of data according to packet 
length and destination port (Fig. 2.c) shows more red or undetected phenomena for 
bigger packets. These are specially created packets for DoS or buffer overflows, 
but it seems it is not trivial for Snort signature creators to develop these types of 
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rules. However, red points in the bottom-left side show that some of them already 
exist. Finally, figure 2.d. shows a very messy representation when matching 
source and destination ports. The bottom horizontal line is a normal situation, 
where attacks against known applications are carried out using source ports bigger 
than 1023, but it can also be found a vertical line representing backscatter phe-
nomena, where packets received are responses from attacked machines from 
spoofed addresses.  
These conclusions are taken from elemental scatter plots and required an advanced 
security knowledge. For a comprehensive comparison, some projection tech-
niques, namely PCA (see section 2.1) and MLHL, were applied to the data under 
study. The obtained projections are shown in Fig. 3. 
 
  
a) PCA projection  b) MLHL projection 
Fig. 3. Projections of data captured by Euskalert (February, 2010) according to Snort output. 
In both visualizations known and unknown data is clearly identified and shown. 
PCA identifies most of the detected attacks related to protocol. Black dots in the 
left vertical line represent matching signatures, but also ICMP related events. The 
same can be observed for the MLHL projection, but getting a bit more scatter and 
structured projection. 
4   Conclusions and Future Research Lines 
From the projections in Figs. 1 and 2 we can conclude that CMLHL provides a 
more sparse representation than the other two methods (PCA and MLHL). This 
enables the intuitive visualization of the honeynet and Snort data.  
Thanks to the CMLHL projections it is easy to get a general idea of the dataset 
structure and Snort performance, and an in-deep analysis can be subsequently car-
ried out. From the analysed dataset, CMLHL gives a more clear representation and 
allows distinction between the detected traffic and those packets that are not. 
Future work will combine some other soft-computing techniques for the intui-
tive visualization of Honeynet and Snort data. 
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